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INTRODUCTION

On October 10, 2004, Yasser Hamdi was put aboard a chartered jet
that plucked him from a navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina, and took
him to his family in Dammam, Saudi Arabia.' The agreement 2 that put
Hamdi on the flight ended a three year saga that had taken Hamdi from the
dusty battlefields of Afghanistan to a Northern Alliance prison, the Joint
Terrorism Taskforce detention center at Guantdinamo Bay, a naval brig in
South Carolina, and even to the United States Supreme Court.3
The Justice Department explained that Hamdi no longer posed a threat
to the United States, and that his potential as an intelligence source had
been tapped out. 4 Hamdi's attorney, Federal Public Defender Frank W.
Dunham, disagreed, believing that the impetus for the release came from an
order from Federal District Judge Robert G. Doumar, who had ordered a
hearing to enquire into the circumstances and justification for Hamdi's
continued detention. 5
This paper focuses on a single issue in Hamdi's release. Part of the
settlement agreement required Hamdi to report to an American consular
official in Saudi Arabia within a week of his arrival in the kingdom and
renounce his American citizenship.6 Hamdi appears to have complied with
the requirement. 7 This paper analyzes whether this clause - apparently
unparalleled in American legal history 8 - is valid and enforceable in the
light of the Supreme Court's citizenship jurisprudence. In other words, can
the "native" 9 return should he ever choose to? Is the clause enforceable, and
does it matter? I conclude that Hamdi could return in the unlikely event he

A2.

1.

Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at

2.
Settlement Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and Yaser Esam Hamdi Regarding the Deportation and Citizenship of Yaser Esam
Hamdi, available at
http://news.public.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.html (last visited Jan 22,
2006) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
3. Markon, supra note 1; see also Jerome A Barron, Citizenship Matters: The
Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PUB. POL'Y 33, 68 n. 183 (2005).
4.
Philip Shenon, U.S. Signals End to Legal Fight Over an 'Enemy Combatant,'
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug 13, 2004 at A10.
5. Markon, supranote 1.
6.
Settlement Agreement, supranote 2, at para. 8.
7.
John R. Crook, Supreme Court Litigant Released to Return to Saudi Arabia, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 262, 262 (2005).
8.
E-mail from David Cole, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, to Author
(Jan 25, 2006, 22:5 1:01 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cole].
9.
See generally STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE (Oxford
University Press) (1988).
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wanted to, that the clause is unenforceable, and that, constitutionally, the
stakes could hardly be higher.
This paper begins by exploring the broad contours of American citizenship jurisprudence and the Supreme Court's protective attitude toward
it. In particular, it notes that though the Court has been careful to stress that
naturalized citizens are not second-class citizens,' 0 the very possibility of
denaturalization renders native-born citizenship, such as Hamdi's, more
secure. Next, it explores the stringent tests established by the Supreme
Court that the government must meet to strip an American of their
citizenship by examining the landmark Supreme Court decisions in this
area.
"The history of denationalization and expatriation in the United States
shows a movement toward prohibiting the government from revoking
citizenship unless the citizen himself manifests an intention to terminate
citizenship.""i This burden is illustrated in the next section by evaluating
the renunciation cases that appear to come closest to Hamdi's situation: the
mass renunciations of American citizenship by some Japanese-Americans
("Nisei") at the Tule Lake internment camp in World War II.
Since these cases hinge largely on the circumstances of the renunciations, the paper next examines what is known about the conditions of the
detention facilities at Guantanamo and Charleston, S.C., where Hamdi
would have been held. It evaluates his likely state of mind by extrapolating
from available accounts of observers. And it assesses the legal backdrop
under which Hamdi made his decision.
It then concludes that under Supreme Court precedent, Hamdi surrendered his citizenship under a high degree of compulsion. Therefore, the
renunciation is not valid. This does not mean that he is innocent of wrong
doing, or that the government erred in acting against him. 12 It does mean,
however, that he is still an American citizen.
10.
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-69 (1964); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S
253, 267-8 (1967) (noting that it is "completely incongruous to have a rule of law under
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship").
11.
Nora Graham, Note, PatriotAct H1 and Denationalization:An Unconstitutional
Attempt to Revive StrippingAmericans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 594, 596
(2004-05).
12.
The government has been able to successfully prosecute American citizens
fighting for the Taliban in the regular criminal justice system, a fact that Justice Scalia found
extremely significant. See Hamdi v. Rmsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 561 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D.Va. 2002)). Justices
Scalia and Stevens also identified at least fourteen statutes that either Hamdi or Lindh could
have been charged with. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 560-62. See also Jared Perkins, Note, Habeas
Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatants,
19 BYU J. PuB. L. 437, 470 (2005); Frank Dunham, Where Hamdi Meets Moussaoui in the
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BACKGROUND: CITIZENSHIP OR THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS' 3

"[T]his priceless right [U.S. citizenship] is immune from
the exercise of governmental powers." 14
-Chief Justice Warren
Though the tone of some judicial analysis injected an element of dubiousness to his claim, 15 the Supreme Court and most commentators did not
question Hamdi's status as an American citizen. 16 Hamdi was a citizen by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
which states that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
17
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."'
18
Hamdi's birth in Louisiana thus made him an American citizen.
War on Terror, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 839, 845 (2005) (offering Hamdi's explanation for his
presence in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, subsequent capture by the Northern Alliance
and transfer to U.S. custody). It must be noted that U.S. citizens can also be detained
without charge in peculiar circumstances, albeit probably not indefinitely. See United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that state interest in public safety can
outweigh an individual's liberty interest in times of war, and the government may detain
individuals whom it believes to be dangerous). See also Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 8485 (1909) (upholding the preemptive arrest of a labor leader during strife. "Such arrests are
not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of
hostile power.").
13.
"Citizenship is man's basic right.., to have rights." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (adapting the holding urged by Chief Justice Warren's dissent in
Perez, 356 U.S. at 62). See also The Anti Detention Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(2003) ("No
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.").
14.
Perez, 356 U.S. at 78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
15.
"Hamdi is apparently an American citizen." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,
462 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004) (emphasis added). See also Juliet
Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional
Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 79, 119 (2004) (noting that the Fourth
Circuit's "characterization of Hamdi's history divorces him from anything but a tenuous
connection with the United States... suggests that Hamdi's failure to cast offhis citizenship
was merely an oversight on his part . . . [and] implies that the accidental retention of his
citizenship, like a clerical error, might be easily remedied").
16.
See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, The Republic of Choice, the Pledge of Allegiance, the
American Taliban, 40 TULSA. L. REv. 599, 623 (2005) (noting that the Supreme "Court
could have easily upheld Mr. Hamdi's detention by insisting that his claim to citizenship was
impaired" but chose not to do so).
17.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The Amendment was enacted in the post-Civil
War context for reasons far removed from immigration jurisprudence. See generally
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: TH1E FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE

BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). Some scholars have challenged the notion that the Amendment
confers citizenship to all children born on American territory, but the idea appears to be
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Once acquired by birth, the loss of citizenship generally requires some
affirmative action.' 9 During World War II and the immediate post war era,
Congress enacted a number of statutes designating actions 20 that would
entail loss of U.S. citizenship. 2' These statutes inevitably triggered a spate
of constitutional challenges, 22 which eventually led to the severe circumscription of the government's ability to strip any American of U.S.
citizenship. 23 Sensitive to the constitutional underpinnings of citizenship as
outlined by the Supreme Court, Congress wrote the current expatriation
statute 24 to expressly require that "a citizen can only lose his citizenship if
he performs an expatriating act voluntarily with the intent to relinquish
United States citizenship. 25
Therefore, though the Supreme Court jurisprudence was once strongly
deferential to Congress in determining which actions would trigger loss of
citizenship,2 6 constitutional jurisprudence since Afroyim v. Rusk, 17 has
severely restricted governmental ability to involuntarily revoke U.S.
citizenship. 28 Justice Black, writing for the Court in Afroyim, explained that
under the Constitution, "the people are sovereign and the Government
firmly established. See, e.g., Charles Wood, Losing Control of America's Future-The
Census, BirthrightCitizenship, and IllegalAliens, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465 (1999).
18.
See Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. NaturalizationPolicies, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 237, 248 (1994).
19.
See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 264 (1967). See also Alan G. James,
Expatriationin the United States: Preceptand Practice Today and Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 853, 889 (1990).
20. See Leonard B. Boudin, InvoluntaryLoss ofAmerican Nationality, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1510, 1513-14 (1960).
21.
Graham, supra note 11, at 598.
22.
See e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958) (finding loss of citizenship for
wartime desertion unconstitutional); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186
(1963) (invalidating Section 349(a)(10) of the Nationality Act of 1952, which imposed loss
of citizenship for leaving the United States during wartime to avoid military service);
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (striking down section 352(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, imposing loss of citizenship for a naturalized
citizen who resided continuously for three years in their country of origin).
23.
Elwin Griffith, Expatriationand the American Citizen, 31 How. L. J. 453, 468
(1988). See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 93(holding that the "fundamental right of citizenship is
secure" as long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon their citizenship).
24.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003).
25.
Graham, supra note 11, at 599 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003)) (emphasis
added).
26.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1471, 1478 (1986).
27. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
28.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) (stating that denationalization is
prohibited as criminal sanction by the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual
punishment). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 26, at 1495 (arguing that when a state "strips
an individual of her citizenship, it may well be tearing the self apart").
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cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship."2 9 Such a severance power could not be found even in the attributes
of national sovereignty, or in the power to conduct foreign affairs. 30
Justice Brennan later observed that Afroyim "held unequivocally that a
citizen has 'a constitutional right to remain a citizen ... unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.' "Furthermore, Afroyim required that" 'the
only way citizenship.., could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation or
This is premised on the constituabandonment by the citizen himself.' ,,31
tional view that "citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the
National Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of
those powers. 32 Afroyim pointedly underlined this, specifically stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly protected American citizens from33the
"forcible destruction" of their citizenship through Congressional action.
Therefore, having had the good fortune to be born in Louisiana, the
only way Hamdi could lose his citizenship was if he voluntarily renounced
it. Consequently, under Afroyim, a hypothetical future challenge by Hamdi
to reclaim his citizenship would hinge almost entirely on the question of
whether his renunciation of citizenship was truly voluntary. This is a
question of fact, and must be determined by looking to the circumstances of
the case.
III. Loss OF CITIZENSHIP JURISPRUDENCE:
35
"MORE PRIMITIVE THAN TORTURE"

Though Hamdi is apparently the first native born citizen ever asked to
surrender his citizenship for national security reasons,3 6 the Supreme Court
previously addressed the ability of the government to denaturalize a citizen
for unsavory political activities in Schneiderman v. United States, 37 the
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
29.
30.
Id.
31.
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 275 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 266, 268) (emphasis added).
Trop, 356 U.S. at 92. But see Aleinikoff, supra note 26 at 1494-95 (noting that
32.
under the Afroyim conception of citizenship as a "cooperative affair," people as citizens are
"constituted by, and constitutive of, the society in which they are raised").
33.
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262. But see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
159 (1963) ("The Constitution is silent about the permissibility of involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship rights.").
34.
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68 (to determine whether citizenship has been
voluntarily relinquished, one must look to the facts of each case).
35.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (noting that deprivation of citizenship "is a form of
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development").
36.
Cole, supra note 8.
37.
320 U.S. 118 (1943). For an excellent analysis of the Schneiderman decision,
including an assessment of Congressional efforts to strip alleged terrorists of U.S.
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seminal case in this area.38 It is hard to overstate the importance of the
Schneiderman decision. David Fontana argues that in its practical impact
on the evolution of the nation, Schneiderman belongs with the other giants
of the constitutional pantheon along with Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch
v. Maryland,Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown v. Board
of Education, and Roe v. Wade.39 Such was the gravity of the case that
Republican Presidential nominee Wendell Wilkie argued - pro bono - on

Schneiderman's behalf before the Supreme Court.4 °
Schneiderman had come to the United States at the age of three, and
became a citizen approximately twenty years later. 41 Both before and after
his naturalization, Schneiderman was active in Communist Party activities, 42 running for Governor of Minnesota as the Party's candidate in

1932. He insisted that his communist beliefs were not incompatible with
respect for the constitution, and professed a willingness to bear arms against
his native Russia if necessary. 44
For its part, the Government alleged, and the lower courts agreed, that
Schneiderman's political beliefs were incompatible with the requisite
attachment to the constitution required for naturalization, and that furthermore, his naturalization had been obtained by willful concealment of his
beliefs and activities.4 5 At argument, Solicitor General Fahy pointed out
that Schneiderman was not only a member of the Communist Party, but an
"intellectual revolutionary" who held leadership positions in the famously
disciplined communist movement.4 6
The government's position had proven persuasive at trial, and indeed
"gained traction" with several Justices. 47 However, the Court had granted
citizenship, see Charles H. Hooker, Comment, The Past as Prologue: Schneiderman v.
United States and Contemporary Questions of Citizenshipand Denationalization,19 EMoRY
INT'L L. REv. 305-381 (2005).
38.
David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon:
Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REv. 35, 41 (2002) ("Schneiderman v. United
States, a 1943 case nominally about denaturalization... came to be about the core meanings

of American national identity, American judicial behavior during wartime, and American
immigration policy.").
39. Id. at 68-69.
40. Hooker, supra note 37, at 322; see also Fontana, supra note 38, at 45.
41.

Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125.

42. In being a Russian-born communist of German Jewish extraction in World War
II, Schneiderman's identity lay at the confluence of many of the era's prejudices. See
Fontana, supra note 38, at 42-43.
43.
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 127.

44.
45.
46.
note 37, at
47.

Id.at 127-128.
Id. at 121-122, 129.
Id. at 147 (quoting Brief for the United States at 25-26). See also Hooker, supra
323.
Hooker, supra note 37, at 321, 323.
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certiorari because it recognized its potentially momentous impact on
"freedom of thought." 48 Against this backdrop, the Court held that because
the stakes of citizenship were so high, its loss could only be countenanced
with "the clearest sort of justification and proof' 49 - evidence so "clear,
unequivocal and convincing" that it could not leave "the issue in doubt." 50
In Schneiderman's case, the Court found the government
had failed to carry
51
its burden; therefore, he retained his citizenship.
Though concerns about Schneiderman's lecturing and writing socialist
tracts may strike us as anachronistic or even quaint compared to the
contemporary threat of terrorist annihilation, 52 these opinions result from
hindsight. Hooker notes that "the Schneiderman Court treated the threat of
Communism extremely seriously." 53 The case was decided during some of
the fiercest fighting in World War II, and the Court noted that54the principles
Schneiderman subscribed to were "distasteful to most of us."
Analogously, the threat from international terrorism is high, and the
principles that Hamdi might espouse (he has chosen to remain silent) 55 as a
potential member of the Taliban would be distasteful to most Americans.
Nevertheless, under the Schneiderman rationale, defense of Hamdi's U.S.
citizenship would be even more critical than Schneiderman's because he
was a native born, not naturalized citizen. Schneiderman's citizenship was
challenged because of an alleged defect in the underlying naturalization
process, but the Court believed defense of political rights outweighed the
import of the defect. Though Hamdi's political views are equally repugnant,
the government has not pointed to an analogous defect in his citizenship
acquisition.
"If the Court had decided Schneiderman the other way, it would have
been likely that millions more Americans would have been deported, and
many more in the future might not have come to the United States, knowing
56
how easily they could be deported for advocating 'un-American' ideas."
Even if an undertone of exaggeration is perceptible in Professor Fontana's
rhetoric, his basic argument is unassailable. As Justice Rutledge pointed
48.
49.
50.
51.

Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 158.
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 160-61.

52. See e.g., BILL MAHER, WHEN You RIDE ALONE You RIDE WiTH BIN LADEN
passim (2005).
53.
Hooker, supra note 37, at 321 n.68.
54.
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 136.
55.
Phil Hirschkorn & Nik Robertson, Hamdi Voices Innocence, Joy About
Reunion, CNN, availableat
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/14/hamdi/index.html (last visited Jan 25,
2006) [hereinafter Robertson].
56.
Fontana, supra note 38, at 70.
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out, a citizen at risk of deportation would be forced to exercise ceaseless
vigilance with respect to his association and speech: "His best course would
be silence or hypocrisy. This is not citizenship. 5 7
This underlying rationale to Schneiderman - that "rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked"58 - is equally applicable to Hamdi,
however venal his crimes, as to any "undesirable other.",59 In words that
ring as true today as they did during World War II, the Court stressed that
the very nature of the right of U.S. citizenship required exacting a heavy
burden of proof from the government:
Were the law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon a
slender reed, and the security of the status of our naturalized citizens might depend in considerable degree upon the
political temper of majority thought and the stresses of the
times. Those are consequences foreign to the best traditions
of this nation and the characteristics of our institutions.6 °
If the Schneiderman Court was concerned about the imposition of
hypocrisy on naturalized citizens by penalizing them for their political
views by detecting flaws in their naturalization, it is a vastly greater
concern that native born citizens not be required to choose between
apparently endless imprisonment and their citizenship. The fact that those
concerns cannot be ignored despite active hostilities was confirmed by a
unanimous Supreme Court in Baumgartnerv. United States,61 handed down
a year after Schneiderman. Baumgartner established that Schneiderman
represented the rule, not the aberration in citizenship cases.6 2
Carl Wilhelm Baumgartner was a naturalized American citizen of German descent who appears to have gone out of his way to antagonize his
American peers by extolling the virtues of Hitler and Nazism and celebrating German invasions in Europe.6 3 He bemoaned the lack of militancy
among German-Americans and indicated that he would be proud to live
57.
58.
59.
migrate to

Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at
Some scholars argue that
the larger body politic.

STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

167 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
125.
measures against foreign "undesirables" invariably
See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE

FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 85 (2003)

("Virtually every significant government security initiative implicating civil libertiesincluding penalizing speech, ethnic profiling, guilt by association, the use of administrative
measures to avoid the safeguards of the criminal process, and preventive detention-has
originated in a measure targeted at noncitizens.").
60.
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 159.
61.
322 U.S. 665 (1944).
62.
Id. at 670-71.
63.
Hooker, supranote 37, at 331.
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under Hitler.64 When asked by the trial court if he had harbored these
sentiments at the time he took his citizenship oath, he affirmed that this had
been the case.65 Nevertheless, at the height of the combat effort in World
War II, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and the Eighth
Circuit's decisions to revoke Baumgartner's citizenship. 66 The Court
underlined that even this outspoken Nazi 67 was entitled to stringent
protections before being deprived of his citizenship.68
Justice Frankfurter, who had dissented in Schneiderman, wrote the
opinion in Baumgartner.69 Stressing that "[n]ew relations and new interests
flow, once citizenship has been granted,"7 ° the Court said that "citizenship
once bestowed should not be in jeopardy nor in fear of exercising its
American freedom 71through a too easy finding that citizenship was
disloyally acquired.",
Justice Murphy's concurrence was even more explicit: "American
citizenship is not a right granted on a condition subsequent that the
naturalized citizen refrain in the future from uttering any remark or
adopting an attitude favorable to his original homeland or those there in
power, no matter how distasteful such conduct may be to most of us."72
If these citizenship rights were sacrosanct for naturalized citizens who
appeared to present a threat at the height of World War II, they must carry
equal gravity for citizens such as Hamdi in the War on Terror. This
comparative historical context is helpful in evaluating the current threat of
Hamdi/terrorism
with the contemporary threat of Schneiderman/communism and Baumgartner/Nazism.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Lewis Woods, High Court Upsets Convictions in Two Appeals on Civil Liberty:
Basic Rights of Individual Despite Charges of Disloyalty are Upheld in Hartzel and
Baumgartner Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1944, at 21. See also Hooker, supra note 37, at
332.
67.
Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 667-68:
Evidence of statements made by Baumgartner over a period of about
seven years beginning in 1933 indicated oft repeated admiration for the
Nazi Government, comparisons between President Roosevelt and Adolf
Hitler which led to conclusions that this country would be better off if
run as Hitler ran Germany, "that regimentation, as the Nazis, formed it
(sic) was superior to the democracy," and that "the democracy of the
United States was a practical farce". One witness of German extraction
testified that Baumgartner told him he was "a traitor to my country" because of the witness's condemnation of Hitler.
68.
Id.at 676-77.
69.
Sneiderman, 322 U.S. at 665.
Id.at 675.
70.
71.
Id.at 676.
72.
Id. at 679 (Murphy, J.,
concurring). See also Hooker, supra note 37, at 333.

2007]

RETURN OF THE NATIVE?

Commentators have pointed out that proposed citizenship loss legislation, 3 suggested to deal with the current threat of terrorism, might founder
on the constitutional rocks of Schneiderman and Baumgartner.74 It is
instructive that the Supreme Court continues to cite Schneiderman in
immigration cases. 75 The next section analyzes the implications of applying
the doctrine to loss of citizenship litigation for both native born and
naturalized citizens.
IV. NATURALIZED OR NATIVE:
76
SECOND CLASS OR THE BITTER BREAD OF BANISHMENT

A.

PERPETUAL FEAR: NATURALIZED CITIZENS

"To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to our 77
law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power."

In analyzing Schneiderman and its progeny, it is important to note that
they pertain to denaturalization proceedings, and thus, by definition, to
naturalized citizens. Justice Rutledge protested that the very ability of
naturalized citizens to lose their status creates precisely what Schneiderman
was supposed to guard against: "two classes of citizens in this country, one
secure in their status and the other subject at every moment to its loss by
proceedings not applicable to the other class. 78
In an earlier case, Knauer v. United States,79 concerning the denaturalization of a Nazi against a factual backdrop very similar to Baumgartner,
Justice Rutledge had opposed the very possibility of denaturalization as
creating an inferior class of citizens: "any process which takes away
[naturalized citizens'] citizenship for causes or by procedures not applicable

310.

73.

H.R. 5440, 107th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2002). See also Hooker, supra note 37, at

74.
See Fontana, supra note 38, at 64-68 (arguing that Schneiderman needs to be
taught in the constitutional canon as a case of judicial independence in wartime: "Schneiderman was by any measure an act of bold judicial independence, resisting executive
wartime efforts in the middle of a war."). Id. at 68. "One year later, the Court prevented the
denaturalization of a proclaimed Nazi, citing Schneiderman." Id.
75.
See, e.g., Kungys v. U.S., 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988).
76.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RiCHARD THE SECOND, Act iii.
Sc. 1(Peter Ure ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1956) (1899-1906).
77.
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
78.
Id. at 619 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
79.
328 U.S. 654 (1946).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

80
to native-born citizens places them in a separate and inferior class."
Opposing the existence of a denaturalization power,81 he wrote:

In my opinion the power to naturalize is not the power to
denaturalize .... Otherwise there cannot but be two classes
of citizens, one free and secure except for acts amounting
to forfeiture within our tradition; the other, conditional,
timorous and insecure because blanketed with the threat
that some act or conduct, not amounting to forfeiture for
others, will be taken retroactively to show that some prescribed condition had not been fulfilled and be so adjudged. 2
With urgency as applicable to Hamdi today it was for the "thoroughgoing Nazi .. .Paul Knauer ' 83 in 1946, he warned that "if one man's
citizenship can be thus taken away, so can that of any other., 84 He argued
that "[u]nless it is the law that there are two classes of citizens, one
superior, the other inferior," the citizenship status of all should be unassailable once conferred. 8 5 The alternative would be to create citizenship "with
strings attached," with the naturalized citizen always on tender-hooks at the
possibility
of having their status revoked due to a retroactive change in the
86
law.
The majority in the Knauer Court agreed that extreme caution was
warranted in proceeding against naturalized citizens, lest the good faith
exercise of citizenship rights, such as unpalatable free speech, be used to
deprive the naturalized citizen of their rights. 87 "Ill-tempered expressions,
extreme views ... are not to be given disloyal connotations in absence of
solid, convincing evidence that that is their significance." 88 The only
alternative would be antithetical to the American constitutional ethos "and
make denaturalization proceedings the ready instrument for political
persecutions." 8 9

80.
Id.at 677 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
81.
The unconstitutional nature of denaturalization is a striking and recurring motif
in Justice Rutledge's writings. See, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 165170 (1943) (concurring opinion); Knauer, 328 U.S. at 675-679 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
82.
Knauer, 328 U.S. at 678 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
83.
Id. at 675.
84.
Id.at 676.
85.
Id.at 677.
86. Id.at 677-78.
87.
Knauer,328 U.S. at 658.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
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Nevertheless, explicitly sidestepping "the question of what limits there
may be to conditions for denaturalization which Congress may provide" the
Supreme Court found for the government. 90 Underscoring the fact specific
nature of denaturalization analysis, they reiterated the heavy Schneiderman
and Baumgartnerburdens, but held that while the government had failed to
meet the high burden of proof in those cases, it had met the burden in
Knauer.91 The key distinctions were factual:
The character of the evidence, the veracity of the witnesses
. . . the corroboration of challenged evidence presented by
the Government, the consistent pattern of Knauer's conduct
before and after naturalization convince us that the . . .
standard of proof, not satisfied in either
the Schneiderman
92
or Baumgartnercases, is ... met here
It is striking that the factual backdrops of Baumgartner and Knauer
were very similar: both involved outspoken Nazis with apparently fanatical
devotion to Hitler. Yet, Baumgartner found for the citizen during the
trauma of World War II, but in peacetime Knauer found for the government. Therefore, the Schneiderman requirement of "clear, equivocal and
convincing" evidence "which cannot leave the underlying issue in doubt"
poses a high, but not insurmountable burden. 93 Perhaps as a reflection of
Schneiderman echoes through .the ensuing years, though Congress has
replaced the high Schneiderman standard with respect to expatriation
94 it has not disturbed
proceedings,
this standard for denaturalization
95
cases.
B.

THE EXILE: THE POSSIBILITY OF STATELESSNESS AND EXPATRIATION
PROCEEDINGS

Though the Supreme Court has emphasized the value of citizenship for
native born and naturalized citizens alike - "Citizenship obtained through
naturalization is not a second-class citizenship" 96 - its "opinions suggest
the right of citizenship is more precious for native-born citizens."9 7 While
the Court has held that there can be no differentiation between native born
90.
Id. at 673.
91.
Knauer, 328 U.S. at 660.
Id.
92.
93.
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943).
94.
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1980).
95.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1981).
96.
Knauer, 328 U.S. at 658.
97.
J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban: Revocation of
Citizenship and Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 263, 287 (2003).
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and naturalized citizens in expatriation proceedings, 98 the very possibility
of denaturalizationrenders native-born citizenship more secure.
Justice Stevens notes that for "the nativeborn citizen [U.S. citizenship]
is a right that is truly inalienable. For the naturalized citizen, however,
Congress has authorized a special procedure that may result in the
revocation of citizenship." 99 Nevertheless, naturalized citizens have two
advantages: they are likely to at least have another nation to turn to upon
losing their U.S. citizenship.' 00 The native born citizen may have nowhere
to go. Second, expatriation proceedings tend to have the evidentiary deck
stacked against the citizen far more than denaturalization proceedings, as
governed by Schneiderman and its progeny.'0'
1.

Banished. People Without A Country

Alluding to one case, Professor Heyman wrote that "the spectacle of
the person without a country is deeply troubling." 10 2 If the Hamdi agreement sets a precedent for the loss of citizenship in terror prosecutions for
native-born citizens, the future could conceivably present the specter of
such troubling spectacles. The plight of the stateless has recently broached
American popular consciousness
with a popular Tom Hanks movie using
03
the issue as a plot device.
The problem of the stateless is not that they are "deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom
of opinion - formulas which were designed to solve problems within given
communities - but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever."' °4 Their plight "is not that they are not equal before the law, but that
no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants
98.
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-69 (1964).
99.
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 784 (1988)(Stevens. J., concurring). See
also id.
100.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in World War II: "When Are You Going to
Indict the Seditionists?", 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 334, 364 (2004) ("The effect of a decree of
cancellation was to reinstate the individual's original nationality.").
101.
David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
PoliticalAsylum andBeyond, 44 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 165, 210 n.163 (1983).
102.
Michael Heyman, Language and Silence: The Supreme Court's Search For the
Meaning ofAmerican DenaturalizationLaw, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 409, 433 (1991).
103.
THE TERMINAL (DreamWorks SKG 2004). For an analysis of the movie, see A.
0. Scott, An Emigre's ParadiseLost and Found, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at E1 (noting
statelessness is "a kind of living death, a nerve-racking state of perpetual limbo"). For an
account of the odyssey of Mehran Nasseri, the real life inspiration for the movie, see Craig
S. Smith, 16 Years on an Airport Bench, and 15 Minutes of Fame, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2004 at A4.
104.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 293 (1951).

20071

RETURN OF THE NATIVE?

'
even to oppress them."
105 For these reasons, international humanitarian law
strongly discourages statelessness, 0° 6 a fact that the Supreme Court has
alluded to in its citizenship jurisprudence. 0 7 Tragically, notwithstanding
the posture of international humanitarian law, the United Nations
estimates
08
that hundreds of thousands of people worldwide are stateless.
The Supreme Court has not been oblivious to the historical overtones
of loss of citizenship as analogous to banishment and the constitutional
dilemma this poses. In Delgadillo v. Cannichael, it held that deportation,
presumably a lower burden than statelessness, is "the equivalent of
banishment or exile."' 0 9 Other federal courts have held that banishment is
prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment." 0 Judge Augustus Hand
declared that such banishment was a "dreadful punishment, abandoned by
the common consent of all civilized peoples ... cruel and barbarous" and a
"national reproach."' l
Indeed, the Romans considered banishment worse
'' 1 2
gentle death in a hot bath with a cut artery."
the
or
poison
"taking
than
Justice Douglas contended that the Founders were familiar with banishment and deliberately withheld the power from the federal govern-

105.
Id. Professor Arendt may have been too sanguine. See Paul Lewis, U.N.
Sending Envoy to Aid Burmese Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1992, at A7 (recounting "a
campaign of torture, killing and forced evictions by the Burmese Army" against its
Rohingya minority, which it insists are not Burmese citizens. "Myanmar's junta maintains
that the Rohingyas are not ethnic Burmese and asserts that those fleeing to Bangladesh are
really illegal immigrants without official identity papers. But many of those crossing the
border say the army forcibly confiscated their papers before expelling them."). See also
Edward A. Gargan, Even Bleak Bangladesh is a Haven to Muslims Fleeing the Burmese
Army, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at A6.
106.

CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §

11.3e (Supp.1990). See also Heyman, supra note 102, at 410.
107.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963) (noting
authorities against statelessness).
108.
Rachel Settlage, No Place to Call Home: Stateless Vietnamese Asylum-Seekers
in Hong Kong, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 187, 187 (1997). As a native of Pakistan, I note that it
is to Pakistan's discredit that it abandoned hundreds of thousands of its citizens in 1971. See
QUTUBUDDIN AzIz, BLOOD AND TEARS (1974); LORAINE MIRZA, INTERNMENT CAMPS OF
BANGLADESH (1998). See also William Claiborne, 250,000 Pakistanis, Stranded in
Bangladesh, Live in Despair, WASH. POST, Jan 22, 1983, at A14; Barry Bearak, Stranded
PakistanisDreamingof Deliverance,N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2000, at Al.
109.
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
110.
Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962).
111.
United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1926). See
also Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern
Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L L. J. 245, 246 (2004) ("In many respects,
deportation can be viewed as a punishment that is more severe than confinement because
removal from home, family, and country can mean permanent exile, in some cases to a
country the deportee may have never actually known.").
112.
HANS VON HENTIG, PUNISHMENT 198 (1973).
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ment. 113 Justice Stevens believed that the loss of citizenship was "tantamount to exile or banishment .... 14 The Supreme Court has recognized
the possibility of statelessness in its own citizenship jurisprudence:" 15 "The
stateless person may end up shunted from nation to nation, there being no
one obligated or willing to receive him ....
16 Even Congress has alluded
to the parallels. "17
At least one state court has found that a condition of probation entailing banishment from the United States was unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection and due process requirements. 118 Further, at least fifteen
states have explicit constitutional prohibitions on the use of banishment as a
punishment. " 9 Such provisions might strike the reader as anachronistic,
deriving from ancient fears of Biblical scenes of banishment into the
burning sands of the desert, or the plight of the medieval exile, rather than
from modem American jurisprudence.
Any such smugness would be misplaced; however, it is instructive that
less than half a century ago, some Southern states actively explored the
20
possibility of using banishment to deal with their civil rights problems. 1
Native American tribes continue to experiment with the use of banishment
as a punitive measure.1 21 The fact that modem jurisprudence continues to
wrestle with this seemingly antiquated issue is an indicator that stripping
122
citizens of their U.S. citizenship is more than an arcane issue.
113.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("History, before the adoption of this Constitution, was not destitute of examples of the
exercise of such a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely ... they
gave to this government no general power to banish.").
114.
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 791 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring).
115.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("An expatriate who,
like Cort, had no other nationality becomes a stateless person - a person who not only has no
rights as an American citizen, but no membership in any national entity whatsoever.").
116.
Id. at 161.
117.
Josd Julian Alvarez Gonzdlez, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional
Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 350
(1990).
118.
Louisiana v. Sanchez, 462 So. 2d 1304, 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
119.
See William Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal
for Its Abolition Under the FirstAmendment, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
455, 465 (1998).
120.
Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and UnusualPunishment, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 758, 759 (1963) (noting Southern efforts to solve the "race problem" by banishing
African Americans).
121.
Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by Drugs, Tribes Revive Ancient
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1 (noting Native American tribes use of banishment,
and deeming it "severe" and "excessive").
122.
See, e.g., State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 923 (N.C. 1953) (holding that no
North Carolina court has the power to pass a sentence of banishment); Weigand v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. 1965) (declaring that the court has no power to
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Burden of Proof

The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment is "most
reasonably ... read as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless
he voluntarily relinquishes it.",123 Indeed, early in the nation's history, many
Congressmen doubted whether citizenship could be given up at all, even
voluntarily. 124 Against this backdrop, the Court has indicated that the
"fundamental right of citizenship is secure" as long as a person does not
25
voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship. 1
The problem is that the Afroyim decision and its progeny never demarcated the contours of what constituted voluntary assent. 126 The Court did
suggest that the determination of voluntary assent required a factual
determination and that it was within the power of Congress to provide rules
of evidence to indicate assent. 127 Visiting the issue in Vance v. Terrazas,
which pertained to a native born U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry who had
renounced but then sought to regain his U.S citizenship, the Court held that
"Afroyim imposed the requirement of intent to relinquish citizenship on a
party seeking to establish expatriation."' 128 However, Vance went on to hold
that voluntary relinquishment
could be inferred from the performance of a
29
designated expatriation act. 1
If the government did establish that an expatriation act had occurred, it
could presumably be voluntary, unless the expatriating citizen proved
otherwise. 130 Congress has designated a list of such actions that will lead to
the loss of citizenship absent some other factor. 131Some lower courts have
gone further than Vance and required an element of intent along with

order exile as an alternative to imprisonment); State v. Charlton, 846 P.2d 341, 343 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the court could not enter even a consensual decree of
banishment).
123.
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980) (quoting Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253, 262) (emphasis added).
124.
See James, supra note 19, at 872 (noting that early expatriation bills were
defeated on this basis).
125.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).
126.
Steven S. Goodman, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent
Requirement in ExpatriationProceedings,56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 341, 346 (1988).
127.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967).
128.
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 262 n.6 (1980).
129.
Id.at 270.
130.
Id.
131.
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2000) (listing acts that lead to loss of native bom citizenship).
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voluntary performance of the expatriating
act. 132 This seems to be closer to
33
1
Vance.
than
the language of the statute
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the government
can strip citizens of their citizenship for voluntarily performing an
expatriation act while simultaneously avowing their intention of retaining
their U.S. citizenship.' 34 Nevertheless, when faced with this issue, at least
one court has found that the expressed intent to retain American citizenship
controls.135 Therefore, a hypothetical suit by Hamdi to regain his citizenship would operate in the Vance burden-shifting framework.
If the government could prove that he had performed. the expatriating
act - in this case renouncing his citizenship - then its voluntariness and
hence efficacy is presumed unless he could prove otherwise. Duress would
void any expatriating act, but it is an affirmative defense that
would have to
36
be proved by the party alleging duress, in this case Hamdi. 1
The question of his citizenship would thus hinge on the voluntariness
of his action. Since he has renounced his citizenship to a consular official,
138
137
he would have to prove duress.
an expatriating act under the statute,
To determine whether he could prove duress, the next section examines
circumstances where the courts have evaluated renunciations to determine
whether sufficient duress underlies the decision to void the renunciation.
V.

THE VIEW FROM TULE LAKE

At the same time that Schneiderman was working its way through the
courts, the federal government had incarcerated thousands of West Coast
Japanese Americans in internment camps. Some of the internment cases
would eventually generate jurisprudence that is perhaps the most closely
analogous to Hamdi's renunciation. Many of these originated at Tule Lake
Camp in Northern California where thousands of Japanese Americans
132.
Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that
loss of citizenship requires the voluntary performance of an expatriating act accompanied by
an intent to relinquish citizenship).
133.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2000) ("A person who is a national of the United States
... shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the
intention of relinquishing United States nationality.") (emphasis added).
134.
Goodman, supra note 126, at 354-55.
135.
Kahane v. Shultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486, 1487-88 (E.D.N.Y 1987).
136.
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 268 (1980) (quoting Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 129, 134 (1958)).
137.
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(5) (2000).
138.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to require courts to
presume the voluntariness of an expatriating act, and it is then up to the renunciant to prove
duress. Vance, 444 U.S. at 268. Under this framework, the burden of proof is on Hamdi to
demonstrate some element of coercion.
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renounced their U.S. citizenship in the final months of World War II and
then sought to regain it on the ground that they had renounced under
duress. 3 9 The Tule Lake internees, their spouses, parents, and children, as
opposed to the internees at the other camps, were those who had answered a
"loyalty questionnaire" incorrectly. 40 Consequently, they were considered
the "worst of the worst,"' 41 or the most suspect
internees among the entire
42
Japanese American West Coast population. 1
"Within the Tule Lake Camp, discontent was much higher and the
Camp officials were much harsher in their administration than the other
nine camps."' 143 Perhaps as a consequence, the Tule Lake facility was
racked by strikes, demonstrations, and finally, military occupation. 144 As
the war wound down and the government announced the closure of the
camps, many of the internees, embittered by their experiences and shaken
by rumors concerning alleged reprisals and atrocities against Japanese
Americans leaving the internment camps, found themselves at the end of
their tether. 145
46
The Renunciation Act of 1944 seemed to offer an avenue of safety; 1
internees believed it might be their only option to keep their families
139.
Patrick Gudridge, The Constitution Glimpsed from Tule Lake, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Spring 2005). See also, Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege:
JapaneseAmerican Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2001) ("Life in the camps was harsh, with internees enduring the desert heat,
cold, and dust storms in hastily constructed wooden barracks with no privacy, poor food, and
very little in the way of meaningful activity.").
140.
Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community
among "We the People, " 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 243 (1997) ("There were two critical 'loyalty'
questions on the registration questionnaire, one involving the willingness to serve in the
armed forces and the second asking for allegiance to the United States and renunciation of
any allegiance to Japan ... Internees, distrustful of authorities who had just completed their
incarceration, resented the implication that they had previously been loyal to Japan. For first
generation immigrants, racially barred from becoming American citizens, 'yes' answers
threatened loss of Japanese citizenship, which would have left them state-less. Those failing
to answer the two critical questions in the proper manner were labeled 'disloyal.' Most of
these so-called 'disloyal' persons, along with their spouses, children and parents were
transferred to the Tule Lake Camp in California, near the Oregon border.").
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 244. See also John Christgau, Collins Versus the World The Fight to
Restore Citizenship to JapaneseAmerican Renunciants of World War 11, 54 PAC. HiST. REV.
1, 19 (1985) (citing the case of an internee who hammered her child to death, as well as
slave labor and secrecy "as evidence of the atmosphere of fear and terror out of which
renunciation emerged").
146.
Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 368, Pub. L. No. 405 (amending Nationality Act of
1940).
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together and avoid violence from a hostile American public.' 47 Passed
while over a hundred thousand Japanese Americans were still interned, the
"Act was intended to facilitate a final resolution of the Japanese-American
problem by allowing ethnic Japanese to 'voluntarily' choose to renounce
American citizenship."'' 48 Until December 1944, there
had been only 600
49
applications for the renunciation of U.S. citizenship. 1
The closure of the camps and the prospect of an uncertain future beyond its fences "changed attitudes."' 15 Some Japanese militarists were
happy to shed their unwelcome allegiances. '5 ' But most of the applications
"came from the panicked reaction of the troubled Tule Lake Camp
residents."'' 52 The applicants believed that their actions would enable them
153
to "keep their families together, stay in Tule Lake, and avoid the draft."'
Many soon realized the repercussions of their actions, and, even before the
end of the war, sought to reverse 54their applications, by "pleading duress,
hysteria, and temporary insanity."1
An unsympathetic Justice Department rebuffed the withdrawal efforts,' 55 designated the renunciants enemy aliens under the Alien Act of
1798, and declared that they were to be deported. 5 6 Large-scale deportations were only averted at the last minute, largely due to the efforts of a
single attorney, Wayne Collins.157 The renunciation cases eventually
culminated in two significant cases: Acheson 60v. Murakami 58 and McGrath
v. Abo' 59 both came before the Ninth Circuit. 1
The Acheson Court found that the treatment of the renunciants effectively stripped them of an intelligent choice, and this element of coercion

147.
Christgau, supra note 145, at 6 (noting conviction that in order to "stay in the
security of the Tule Lake Center, renunciation was necessary").
148.
Gotanda, supra note 140, at 242.
149.
Id. at 244.
150. Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Gotanda, supra note 140, at 245.
155.
Christgau, supra note 145, at 26 (noting that the government acknowledged that
"parental pressure, mass hysteria, and fear of deportation had created 'neuroses' at Tule
Lake" but "insisted that it had not sought to 'entrap' the renunciants").
156.
Gotanda, supra note 140, at 245.
157.
Id. To reflect the atmosphere in which the cases would have been litigated, one
account indicates that an FBI agent offered to go through Collin's trash to alert the Justice
Department to his litigation strategy. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 197 (1983). There is
no indication that the Justice Department accepted the offer. Id.
158.
176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
159.
186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951).
160.
Gudridge, supra note 139, at 82-83.
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voided their renunciations.1 6 1 Further, McGrath held that the treatment of
the Tule Lake renunciants created a rebuttable presumption that they had
acted under duress, but it offered the government a chance to overcome the
presumption by evaluating each case on its merits. 162 Chief Judge Drennan
of the Ninth Circuit would later
63 explain the Acheson decision in one of its
progeny, Fukumoto v. Dulles:1
American officers... treated the Nisei as "outcasts" in the
full sense of that word. They were cast out of their homes
for over two years, their families often separated, with a
huge loss of property sold under the evacuation pressure of
from one to ten days notice, and they had destroyed their
businesses, their established professions and the earning
power of mechanics and laborers. Over four thousand such
Nisei under pressure of that outrageous treatment gave up
their citizenship. We held.., that such acts of denaturalization were involuntary. 164
The key seems to have been that the deprivations of the internment
regime, particularly at Tule Lake, 165 were so intense that the applications
could not be voluntary. 166 Again, in McGrath, Chief Judge Denman seemed
to highlight the difficulty of the circumstances at the time of the renunciations as undercutting the voluntariness, and thus the legal effectiveness, of
the renunciation:
The evidence ... shows the oppressive conditions prevailing there [at Tule Lake] were in large part caused or made
possible by the action and inaction of those government officials responsible for them during their internment. Because of the oppressiveness of this imprisonment by the
161.
Acheson, 176 F.2d at 954 ("Underlying all the particular factors so found as
leading to a condition of mind and spirit of the American citizens imprisoned at Tule Lake
Center, which make the renunciations of citizenship not the free and intelligent choice of
appellees, is the unnecessarily cruel and inhuman treatment of these citizens (a) in the
manner of their deportation for imprisonment and (b) in their incarceration for over two and
a half years under conditions in major respects as degrading as those of a penitentiary and in
important respects worse than in any federal penitentiary, and (c) in applying to them the
Nazi-like doctrine of inherited racial enmity ..
.
162.
McGrath, 186 F.2d at 773.
163.
216 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1954).
164.
Id.
165.
DONALD E. COLLINS, NATIVE AMERICAN ALIENS 126 (1985); Gotanda, supra
note 140, at 244 n.40 ("In the summer of 1944 Tule Lake had become Hades.") (quoting
Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps (1987)).
166.
Gudridge, supranote 139, at 99.
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government officials, a rebuttable presumption arises as to
those confined at 167
Tule Lake that their acts of renunciation
were involuntary.
"The oppressiveness of this imprisonment" in the case of Hamdi is
evaluated in the next section. It is pertinent, however, that Chief Judge
Denman's view of the circumstances of internment and their consequent
effect on the validity of renunciations came to be widely accepted. By
1959, of the 5,766 Japanese Americans who had renounced their citizenship, 5,409 had sought to have it restored. Of these, 4,987 ultimately
succeeded.168
A.

CIRCUMSTANCES LACKING DURESS

[T]he cases make it abundantly clear that a person's free
choice to renounce United States citizenship is effective
whatever the motivation. Whether it is done in order to
make more money, to advance a career or other relationship, to gain someone's hand in marriage, or to participate
in the political process in the country to which he has
moved, a United States citizen's free choice to renounce his
citizenship results in the loss of that citizenship. 169
The Tule Lake cases do not mean that the act of renunciation is one
that can be taken lightly. The Ninth Circuit noted that it would not "accept a
test under which the right to expatriation can be exercised effectively only
if exercised eagerly." 170 In Abo, Chief Judge Brennan noted the Supreme
Court's admonishment in Savorgan v. United States171 that "the forsaking
of American citizenship, even in a difficult situation, as a matter of
expediency, with attempted excuse of such conduct later
when crass
172
material considerations suggest that course, is not duress."'
Savorgan concerned an American citizen who had married an Italian
diplomat. 173 She could not secure the royal blessing for her wedding
74
without becoming an Italian citizen and renouncing her U.S. citizenship. 1
She did so but later sought to regain her citizenship, claiming that her
167.
McGrath, 186 F.2d at 773.
168.
Christgau, supra note 145, at 30.
169.
Richards v. Sec'y of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985).
170.
Id.
171.
338 U.S. 491 (1950).
172.
Savorgan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 502 n.18 (quoting Doreau v. Marshall,
170 F.2d 721, 724 (1948)).
173.
Savorgan, 338 U.S. at 494.
174.
Id.
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marital situation created undue stress. 17 5 The case eventually reached the
Supreme 17Court,
which found the renunciation to be sufficiently voluntary to
6
be valid.
Similarly, in Jolley v. INS, the plaintiff had moved to Canada to avoid
the draft and renounced his citizenship. 177 In denying his subsequent efforts
to retrieve his citizenship by claiming that he had renounced under duress,
the Fifth Circuit held that he could not rely on dislike of the Selective
Service laws to argue that he had labored under a degree of compulsion so
extreme as to constitute duress: "Dislike for the law does not in and of itself
compose178coercion; subjective detestation cannot be metamorphosed into
duress."'
Finally, in Kahane v. Sec 'y of State, the plaintiff had surrendered his
U.S. citizenship in order to be eligible to take a seat in the Israeli Parliament. 179 The plaintiff argued that he had acted under compulsion, and he
characterized Israeli law as holding "a gun to my head."'' 80 The court found
that the desire to further his political career was insufficient to constitute
duress: "Plaintiff had the chance to consider the several options and make a
choice. Renouncing his American citizenship may have been difficult, but
he did so voluntarily."' 18 1 Therefore, the mere fact that Hamdi found his
situation unpleasant is insufficient to constitute duress. In terms of the
Kahane analysis, the key issue is whether he had sufficient options to
constitute a meaningful choice. The availability of choices is what makes
the renunciation voluntary and, hence, effective.
B.

CIRCUMSTANCES REFLECTING DURESS

There does not appear to be a Supreme Court case finding a citizen
renunciation void due to undue duress. However, in Savorgan the Court,
with apparent approval, listed several that met the requisite threshold in for
sufficient undue duress to void the underlying renunciation. 182 The facts of
these cases - Dos Reis v. Nicolls, 183 Schioler v. United States, 184 and In re
Gogal185 - presumably delineate the contours of the "duress doctrine." For
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 502.
Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.at 1250.
700 F. Supp. 1162, 1163 (D.D.C. 1988).
Id.at 1167.
Id.
Savorgan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 502 n.18 (1950).
161 F.2d 860 (lst Cir. 1947).
75 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
75 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1947)

(1971).
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instance, the plaintiff in Don Reis, Joao Camera had potentially lost his U.S.
citizenship after enlisting in the Portuguese Army. 186 He had been told that
the only alternative to conscription was a concentration camp. 187 The court
held that his actions were insufficiently voluntary to constitute a valid
renunciation. 188
Similarly, Andrew Gogal, the citizen in Gogal, was drafted into the
Czech Army under analogous circumstances.' 89 The trial court determined
90
that he had acted out of compulsion and thus remained a U.S. citizen.'
Finally, in Schioler, the plaintiff, Marie J. Periolat, had applied for Danish
citizenship during World War II to protect her family during the Nazi
occupation of Denmark; 19 1 the occupation and the desire to protect her
family was held
to constitute sufficient duress to enable her to retain her
92
citizenship. 1
Other cases on point seem to reflect the Savorgan requirement of a
high degree of deprivation and lack of a meaningful choice. For instance,
Takehara v. Dulles193 held that a citizen who had voted in a Japanese
election because he feared that the only alternative was loss of his ration
card and consequent famine had acted under
a compulsion. 194 Therefore, he
95
1
had not effectively expatriated himself.
Similarly, Fukumoto v. Dulles dealt with a "reverse Tule-Lake" scenario; the citizen was residing in Japan at the outbreak of World War 11 and
renounced his Japanese citizenship in September 1941.196 However, finding
himself trapped in Japan by the war, he sought and retrieved his Japanese
citizenship in 1943, an act that the government contended cost him his U.S.
citizenship. 197 As an American he had been harassed by the police and had
his ration and clothing allowances slashed. 198 Drawing the parallels to the
Tule Lake experiences, and, noting that the courts had restored the
186.
161 F.2d at 861.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 865-66.
189.
Gogal, 75 F. Supp. at 269.
190.
Id. at 271.
191.
Schioler v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
192.
Id. ("Where an American citizen finds himself and his family, as Paul Schioler
did, in a theatre of war, their safety threatened, facing the gravest of dangers, even possible
death or internment, and in this extremity ... makes application for foreign citizenship in an
effort to preserve the lives and safety of his family ... I am of the opinion that under such
circumstances the joinder of the wife is not such a voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
her nationality as to forfeit her American-born citizenship.").
193.
205 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1953).
194.
Id.
195.
Id. at 562.
196.
216 F.2d 553, 553 (9th Cir. 1954).
197.
Id. at 553-54.
198.
Id. at 555.
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citizenship of Japanese Americans who had renounced under analogous
pressure, the Ninth Circuit restored his citizenship stating, "it is well in
cases of human motivation of people of other races that we consider our
own psychology."' 99
Finally, in Doreau v. Marshall,20 0 the plaintiff claimed that her application for foreign citizenship was intended to forestall internment in a
concentration camp. 20' The Appeals Court held that proof of duress would
be a complete defense: "No case has been called to our attention nor have
we found any which holds that duress is not a defense [to alleged loss of
U.S. citizenship]. 2 °2 It20 3therefore remanded the case for a trial court
deliberation of the facts.
C.

CITIZEN HAMDI: A DURESS ANALYSIS

The pivotal question for Hamdi, therefore, appears to be on which end
of the Savorgan spectrum he falls. Was he, like Mrs. Savorgan, making a
deliberated decision to suit his convenience? Or, like the Tule Lake and the
World War II renunciants, was he under so much compulsion that he could
plausibly reclaim his citizenship down the road? The question is necessarily
one of fact - a "totality of the circumstances" test based on an individualized assessment of his situation.
That the final determination is. fact intensive is underscored by the
different outcomes of cases that appear to differ only at the margins in their
facts. In Stipa v. Dulles, the plaintiff accepted employment with the Italian
police in the aftermath of World War II, an act that would have constituted
renunciation at the time.20 4 He argued that his dire financial straits and the
absence of work in post war Italy meant that he had acted under economic
compulsion and duress should void any renunciation.20 5 Holding that "[t]he
means of exercising duress is not limited to guns, clubs or physical threats,"
the court agreed with him. 206 Finding that he had acted under unacceptable
duress, it found that he had retained his citizenship.20 7
The facts of Richards v. Sec 'y of State were apparently similar, but the
court assessed a lesser degree of compulsion, and thus arrived at a different
outcome.20 8 Richards argued that he had been forced to obtain Canadian
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.at 554.
170 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir. 1948).
Id.
Id.at 724.
Id.
233 F.2d 551, 554 (3d Cir.1956).
Id.
Id.at 555.
Id.at 556.
752 F.2d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).
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citizenship in order to accept a job to alleviate his financial stress, and that
this constituted duress. 20 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected his argument,
differentiating his case from Stipa in that he had not shown the requisite
degree of hardship. 210 Noting that there was no evidence that Richard "was
the court held Richard
under any particularly onerous financial obligations"
211
had fallen far short of proving economic duress.
Finally, the efforts of feminist poet Margaret Randall to recover her
citizenship are instructive.2 12 She had expatriated herself by marrying a
Mexican citizen and taking Mexican citizenship to obtain employment to
support her family. 21 3 The government viewed this as a renunciation and
determined that she had lost her U.S. citizenship.2 14 The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, determined that Randall's straitened circumstances
at the time of the renunciation constituted de facto economic duress.215
Therefore the renunciation was ineffective.2 16
So, to which end would Hamdi be closer? On one hand, "[t]he law
does not exact a crown of martyrdom as a condition of retaining citizenship. 21 7 On the other hand, there is no requirement that in order to be
effective, the citizen renounce their citizenship with a smile on their face. 218
To apply the fact intensive duress analysis in Hamdi's case, the next section
explores what is known, or can be reasonably extrapolated from accounts of
Guantanamo and Charleston.
VI. INSIDE THE WIRE 219 - HAMDI AT GUANTANAMO AND CHARLESTON

"I wanted
to sign anything, everything, just to get out of
220
there"
Yaser Hamdi has been reticent regarding the conditions of his captivity. 221 Professor Lahav noted recently that "[i]t appears that after his
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id. at 1419-1420.
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 997-98 (2002).
212.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
Steven R. Peikin, Book Review, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 252, 256-57
215.
(1990).
216.
Id.
217.
Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
218.
Richards v. Sec'y of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985).
219.
See generally, ERIK SAAR, INSIDE THE WIRE (2005).
220.
Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantdnamo, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4.
221.
Robertson, supra note 55 ("He would not give specifics on his treatment during
his time in U.S. custody").
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release, Mr. Hamdi has refrained from talking to the press. 222 Since first
hand information on the conditions of his confinement is limited, 223 an
evaluation of Hamdi's motivation requires assembling a picture from
multiple sources - Hamdi's own limited narratives, 224 other contemporary
accounts,225 U.N. documents, Erik Saar's description of life at Guantanamo
in his book Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness
Account of Life at Guantanamo,226 and Captain James
Yee's account in For
227
God and Country: Faith andPatriotismUnder Fire.
A.

"THE LEAST WORST PLACE": 228 CONDITIONS AT GUANTANAMO AND
CHARLESTON

Both Sergeant Saar and Captain Yee agree that conditions at Guantanamo were difficult. Outside observers have come to the same conclusion. 2 29 A U.N. report went so far as to characterize the conditions and
practices at the detention facilities as tantamount to 23torture, 230 a characterization vigorously disputed by the U.S. Government. ' Hamdi stated that he

222.
Lahav, supra note 16, at 603 n.41.
223.
But see Brinkley, supra note 220 (containing an interview shortly after his
release, in which Hamdi talked about conditions of detention).
224.
Id.
225.
See, e.g., Kate Zemike, Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern on Prison
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at AI (discussing military reports and other documents that
showed how abuse involved multiple service branches in Guantanamo and other military
detention facilities). See also Josh White & Carol D. Leonnig, U.S. Cites Exception in
Torture Ban, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2006 at A4 (citing a federal judge observing that the
plaintiffs allegations "describe disgusting treatment, that if proven, is treatment that is cruel,
profoundly disturbing and violative of U.S. and foreign treaties banning torture.").
226.
See generally, SAAR, supranote 219.
227.
See generally, JAMES YEE, FOR GOD AND COUNTRY: FAITH AND PATRIOTISM
UNDER FIRE (2005).
228.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's description of Guantanamo. See Rui Wang,
Assessing the Bush Administration'sDetention Policyfor Taliban andAl-Qaeda Combatants
at Guantanamo Bay in Light of Developing United States Case Law and International
HumanitarianLaw, Including the Geneva Conventions, 22 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413,
421 n.72 (2005).
229.
Anthony Lewis, Give Me Liberty: IndividualRights in a Time of War, 13-SUM
MEDIA L. & POL'Y 6, 10 (2004) ("From what we know, which is not much, the prisoners are
held in stringent conditions, in solitary confinement, and are subject to frequent interrogation.").
230.
U. N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Comm. on Human Rights: Situation of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Future E/CN.4/2006/120, Feb. 15, 2006 at 23-27, available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_06_unguantanamo.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2006) [hereinafter Commission].
231.
Id at 53.
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found the solitary confinement in Charleston far worse.232 Since these
detention facilities formed the mental and physical backdrop under which
Hamdi made his decision, they are worth examining. The underlying
reasoning, derived from the Tule Lake cases, is that an American citizen
should not be put in a position where renunciation of citizenship appears to
be the only reasonable option.2 33
President Bush has ordered that the detainees in the war on terror must
be treated humanely in accordance with the Geneva Convention, but only
"to the extent appropriateand consistent with military necessity. -234 Critics
have complained that the caveat effectively eviscerates the preceding
directive, or at the very least, subordinates humane treatment considerations
to military needs.235
Though Hamdi has remained reticent, conditions at Guantdtnamo under
Major General Geoffrey Miller,23 6 whether at the original "Camp XRay, ' 237 or later Camp Delta, appear to have been difficult. 238 An FBI
investigation determined that some prisoners were losing their minds:
"Some [detainees] were found to have urinated or defecated on themselves
and one detainee was found curled in a ball, a pile of hair on the floor next
to him, that he had pulled from his own head. ' ' 239 Temperatures were
high, 240 guard patience lOW 24 1 and the "stench was unbearable., 242 Anti232.
Essam AI-Ghalib, Yasser Plans to Write a Book Someday, Arab News, (Oct. 17,
2004), available at
http://www.arabnews.com/?page= 1 &section=0&article=5302 I&d= 17&m = 1O&y=2004 (last
visited Jan 28, 2006).
233.
Gudridge, supra note 139, at 99.
234.
Memorandum from Sec'y of Def., to Commander, U.S. Southern Command 5
(Apr. 16, 2003),
www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20040622doc9.pdf
(regarding Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism) (emphasis added) (last
visited Mar 13, 2006).
235.
Commission, supra note at 230, at 23.
236.
See Editorial, A General'sDishonor, WASH. POST., Jan 15, 2006, at B6 (noting
that the General had invoked his right to avoid self-inchimination, and was sanctioned for his
command at Guantanamo).
237.
Camp X-Ray was the original and temporary detention facility at Guantanamo
that the public often (mistakenly) believes to be the current facility, Camp Delta. Hamdi
would likely have been held there. See SAAR, supra note 219, at 42 ("It was a jumble of
razor wire, with cells open to the elements and buckets in place of toilets. It looked more
like an animal shelter in a bad neighborhood than a place to keep people.").
238.
YEE, supra note 227, at 99 (noting that "conditions inside Camp Delta were
slowly becoming less tolerable").
239.
Id. at 113.
240.
SAAR, supra note 219, at 65 (noting that the cell blocks "could be brutally hot").
241.
Id. at 136 (noting one commander "who believed in payback, ordered up good
old-fashioned beatings").
242.
Id. at 51 (noting that the stench inside the prison was unbearable).
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Muslim feeling 243 might have contributed to the severity of the treatment. 24
The State Department has sanctioned other nations for the same practices that were used at Guantanamo.2 45 Many practices are considered
unacceptable under humanitarian law.246 In addition to the threat of
"extraordinary rendition," or transfer 247 to a nation that openly practiced
249
torture,248 and aggressive questioning tactics at the facility itself,
violence was frequent.2 5 ° In one instance Military Policemen undergoing
prisoner-subduing training were not informed that their practice subject was
a fellow American soldier. 25 1 During the training session, the guards injured
their fellow soldier so badly that he had to be evacuated off the island, and
was left with permanent brain damage.252
These conditions and the fear they undoubtedly generated "led to serious mental health problems '2 53 on the part of the detainees.2 54 There were
multiple suicide attempts,2 55 and, at any single time, a minimum of ten to
twenty prisoners were considered to be at risk of committing suicide.25 6
With at least a third of the prisoners on anti-depressants, "depression was
common." 257 Some of the detainees were clearly at the end of their
tether. 258 The U.N. documented "over 350 acts of self-harm in 2003 alone,
243. YEE, supra note 227, at 41, 43 (quoting Chaplain O'Keefe, an American Muslim
officer of Irish descent warning him that "Guantanamo was the most hostile environment
he'd ever experienced.").
244.
Id. at 104 ("The environment at Guantanamo was incredibly hostile for
Muslims, and it was impossible to ignore the palpable division that existed between many
soldiers and the Muslim personnel.").
245. SAAR, supra note 219, at 249.
246. See Lisa Hajjar, Our Heart of Darkness, AMNESTY Now, at 1 (2004), available
(discussing techniques used at
at www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/darkness.html
Guantanamo but banned by international law) (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
247. Commission, supranote at 230, at 26-27.
248. SAAR, supra note 219, at 247.
249. Id.at 243 (noting charges that "the military was using coercion tactics that were
'tantamount to torture' on Gitmo detainees, including exposure to extreme cold, loud noise
and music, stress positions, solitary confmement, and 'some beatings.").
250. YEE, supra note 227, at 109 (describing an incident where a "guard kept beating
the prisoner's head... He beat him until his head was split open.").
251. SAAR, supra note 219, at 190.
252. Id.
253. Commission, supranote at 230, at 25.
254. SAAR, supra note 219, at 66 ("Clearly, some of the detainees were under a good
deal of psychological stress.").
255. Id.at 66. See also id at 100, 104 (describing suicide attempts).
256. YEE, supranote 227, at 100.
257. Id.
258. SAAR, supra note 219, at 89 (noting that "some of them [detainees] had really
reached the end of the rope").
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individual and mass suicide attempts and widespread, prolonged hunger
strikes. , 25 9
Sergeant Saar observed that he could tell when detainees returned
from a tough interrogation session: "[t]hey often had a defeated look: head
held low and eyes lifeless. Sometimes it was more obvious; they'd sit
huddled in a fetal position in the comer of their cells, staring off into space
or even quietly crying., 260 Many of the prisoners were despondent and
some even went mute. 26 ' Others regressed under the strain: "[m]any of
them acted like children ... they would respond . . . in a childlike voice,
talking complete nonsense. Many of
them would loudly sing childish songs,
262
repeating the song over and over.,
Many of the most severe tactics that contributed to the mental breakdowns, particularly the violations of religious norms,2 63 were prohibited by
military rules. 264 Naval personnel protested that some of the techniques
prevalent at the facility were "repulsive and potentially illegal., 265 Military
lawyers vigorously protested the harsh treatment regimen, but were
overruled by civilian officials at the Pentagon. 266 In addition, violations of
military rules were largely swept under the carpet. 267 The U.N.complained
that no one had apparently been brought to justice for torture, and perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment appeared to operate with impunity.2 68
Distilling these various sources into a coherent account or estimate of
Hamdi's condition is difficult at best. Indeed, among the myriad of
accounts now emerging from Guantanamo and other facilities, determining

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
desecration
over prayer
264.
265.

Commission, supra note 230, at 31.
SAAR, supra note 219, at 65.
YEE, supranote 227, at 100.
Id.at 101.
Id.at 110-26 (detailing the use of Islamic beliefs against detainees, including
of scriptures, provocative handling by female guards, the playing of loud music
sessions, and distribution of evangelical literature attacking the Islamic faith).
Id.at 113.
Dana Priest & Bradley Graham, US. Struggled Over How Far To Push Tactics,
WASH. POST, Jun 24, 2004 at A6.
266.
Id. (noting that "20-hour interrogations, light and sound assaults, stress
positions, exposure to cold weather and water" were approved.). See also Jane Mayer, The
Memo: How an InternalEffort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees was Thwarted,
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (detailing efforts at the Pentagon, led by Alberto J.
Mora, General Counsel for the Navy, to prohibit detainee mistreatment).
267.
YEE, supra note 227, at 113 (stating that "these rules were being openly violated
and nobody seemed to care.").
268.
Commission, supra note 230, at 27. Later, however, the report noted the U.S.
government's position that the U.N. did not consider evidence offered by the United States,
and in particular, refused to visit Guantanamo under conditions similar to those offered to
U.S. Congressional delegations. Id.at 53.
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the veracity of each claim is virtually impossible. 269 Nevertheless, the
accounts all converge on one pivotal point: conditions at the prison were
difficult - and apparently at least as stringent as the Tule Lake background
that the Ninth Circuit found had denied the Japanese-American renunciants

a meaningful choice in World War II.
B.

KAFKA REVISITED: PROVING A NEGATIVE

Part of the concern about any mistreatment at Guantanamo is that it is

apparently endless, and potentially outside the purview of judicial
review. 270 Indefinite detention alone is considered a form of abuse. 27 1 The

late Professor Fitzpatrick noted that "[i]ndefinite incommunicado detention
itself may contravene human rights norms because of the debilitating
psychological effects.,

272

At the time of his plea agreement, Hamdi had

been under arrest for almost three years, and the hopelessness of his

situation must have impressed itself on him.273 While Hamdi has been
taciturn, 274 other detainees who have been subsequently released have
talked about the powerful psychological and mental impact of prolonged

and indefinite solitary confinement.2 75

269.
White & Leonnig, supra note 225 (regarding Pentagon claims denying
mistreatment at the camp, including causing a detainee to soil himself, Judge Kessler
observed: "I know it's a sad day when a federal judge has to ask a DOJ attorney this, but I'm
asking you - why should I believe them?").
270.
Id. (quoting Human Rights Watch as saying "The law says you can't torture
detainees at Guantanamo, but it also says you can't enforce that law in the courts." Detainee
attorney, Thomas Wilner, who represents several detainees agreed: "This is what
Guantanamo was about to begin with, a place to keep detainees out of the U.S. precisely so
they can say they can't go to court.").
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OPERATIONAL UPDATE, U.S. DETENTION
271.
RELATED TO THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ITS AFTERMATH - THE ROLE OF THE

ICRC (2004), availableat
http://www.icrc.orgWeb/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/D8B51 0EE13FCDD6C 1256EDD004
C580F (maintaining that any detainees remaining at Guantanamo either be charged,
released, or, at a minimum, have their continued detention governed by the law) (last visited
Mar. 2, 2005).
272.

Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism:

Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 457, 480 (2003). See also
Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run For Your Life:
Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56
HASTINGS L. J. 801, 900 (2005).

Hamdi's attorney noted the problem. See Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Where
273.
Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 183 MIL. L. REv. 151, 166 (2005) (the "government contended it
could hold Hamdi indefinitely, in solitary confinement, incommunicado, without access to
counsel and without charge or hearing of any kind as an 'enemy combatant.' ").
Lahav, supra note 16 at 603 n.4 1.
274.
275.
Proulx, supra note 272, at 900.
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When placed in a situation similar to Hamdi, Captain Yee retained a
top-notch Washington attorney - Eugene R. Fidell, a Harvard law alum and
president of the National Institute of Military Justice.276 However, despite
his impeccable legal pedigree and years of experience, even Fidell
struggled with the black-hole nature of the Yee case.2 77 So Byzantine was
the opposing bureaucracy that despite his best efforts, he could not even
determine at whose behest Yee was being held under exceptionally harsh
conditions. 278
The inability of an elite military lawyer to handle even routine matters
for a U.S military officer invokes grotesque scenarios from the pages of
Kafka or Gogol in the average American mind. 279 Recalling the Ninth
Circuit's admonition that in evaluating the mental state of others "[i]t is
well ... that we consider our own psychology, ' '280 it is sobering to recall
that Captain Yee, a West Pointer familiar with America and military life,
with the benefit of extensive psychological training, represented by multiple
attorneys, including the President of the National Institute of Military
Justice found himself struggling to cope after seventy-six days. 281 Hamdi, a
stranger in an unfamiliar land, would have been much further along the
road after three years. Indeed, his access to counsel - as a courtesy, not a
legal right - had come years, not weeks, into his detention, and with severe
restrictions. 282
This is hardly a revelation. "[T]he prospect of indefinite detention, of
not knowing when or if they will be released, of years of similarly
impoverished routine, works unimaginable psychological hardship. 2 83
Apparently even American military personnel at Guantanamo Bay began to
buckle under the fatigue of the indefinite and seemingly interminable nature
of their tour of duty.284 Their seemingly perpetual tour of duty prompted
them to make grim comparisons with the detainees.285
276.
YEE, supra note 227, at 174.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
See Pueng Vongs, James Yee's Supporters: We're Relieved, Outraged,PACIFIC
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://altemet.org/story/17282/ (last visited Jan
28, 2006).
280.
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281.
YEE, supra note 227, at 174.
282.
Barron, supra note 3, at 36-37. See also John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 573, 590 (2006) ("Hamdi, for example, approves of a detainee's access to counsel,
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"[TIhe uncertainty and the anxiety about whether we'd be able to leave Cuba, the sense of
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For their part, multiple accounts indicate that the detainees were consumed by the apparently eternal purgatory they had been cast into.286 Saar
noted that he was repeatedly asked "almost maniacally" virtually every day
about their prospects for release.28 7 He attributed much of the mental ' toll
28
that Guantanamo was extracting to the serpentine "Night Without End
nature of the experience. 28 9 Hamdi's account to CNN reflects Saar's
assessment of the detainees' experiences: "I didn't know what was going on
- really I didn't know anything. I was just in a big question mark, and I
didn't know any answers to any questions. 290
Against this backdrop, any prospect of release would have been as
welcome as manna from heaven. As Hamdi's attorney, Frank Dunham
explained: "When you've been in solitary confinement for three years and
somebody puts a piece of paper in front of you that says you can get out of
jail free if you sign it, you don't really worry too much about the rest of the
fine print. 29 1 In Hamdi's case however, the "rest of the fine print" included
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Both Captain Yee 292 and Sergeant Saar 293 agree that both innocent and

guilty men have found their way into the nation's "warehouse in the war on

terror." 294 For Yaser Hamdi, the price of release from the "warehouse" was

his U.S. citizenship. To be effective, his renunciation must have been
voluntary. To be voluntary, Hamdi must have had choices. However,
available accounts 295 indicate that he acted under duress akin to that of the
Tule Lake detainees sixty years ago. Ultimately, his statement that "I
wanted to sign anything, everything, just to get out of there, 296 drives home
complete powerlessness that goes with not knowing when a really bad ordeal is going to
end.").
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SAAR, supra note 219, at 208 ("[Tlhey had been locked up all that time for no
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human behavior when one group of people is given complete control over another in a
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the conclusion that an independent observer would likely arrive at: his
renunciation was probably not voluntary, and thus not valid.
The Supreme Court had given Hamdi some rights - notice of charges,
counsel, and the right to a hearing, but put the burden of proof on him to
show that he was not, as the government claimed, an "enemy combatant., 2 97 Professor Chemerinsky is greatly troubled by this requirement:
"How can somebody prove a negative? How can I prove to you that I am
not an enemy combatant? How could Hamdi show that? ' 298 While
determining whether Hamdi had any meaningful choice, it is instructive to
note that more than four years after the first prisoners were flown out of
Afghanistan, "not a single habeas corpus2 99petition has been decided on the
merits by a United States Federal Court.,
Professor Chemerinsky fears that America is reliving its worst impulses: "Throughout American history whenever there has been a crisis,
especially a foreign-based crisis, the response has been repression. We
have come to realize in hindsight that we were not made any safer." 30 0 In
evaluating the Court's likely disposition of a potential Hamdi petition to
regain his citizenship, it must be remembered that the Court is neither
oblivious to external realities nor unswayed by passion, a reality acknowledged by judges,3 ° ' media,30 2 and even fiction.30 3 The late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist wrote that it was both inevitable and desirable that civil
liberties not occupy as "favored" a position in wartime as in times of
peace. 3 °4 Indeed, it is sobering to reflect and realize that not only does
Korematsu remain valid law, 30 5 but it continues to receive support from
30 6 and Judge Posner. 30 7
luminaries such as the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
297.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) ("[Olnce the Government puts
forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the
onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that
he falls outside the criteria.").
298.
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Against this backdrop however, there is another, more hopeful recurring motif in American jurisprudence: a constant effort to defend liberty.
Schneiderman remains a prime example that remains as valid today for an
apparently Islamist Saudi-American as it was for a Russian immigrant of
German Jewish extraction with socialist sympathies in 1944.
Schneiderman stands as a point of origin and coalescence
for a denationalization jurisprudence that has time and
again prioritized constitutional safeguards for citizenship
over concern for efficiency in national security. More than
anything, Schneiderman and its progeny have consistently
raised the commonalities of our constitutional commitments, few though they may be, above our differences. In
this way, Schneiderman holds an active role in our national
future even as it harkens to the past.308
The preciousness of U.S. citizenship could hardly be more evident
than in the Hamdi case itself.309 The Supreme Court held, 8-1, that
American citizens were entitled to judicial hearings to evaluate the
circumstances of their confinement. 3 10 Though there is apparently no
textual basis in the Constitution for the distinction 3 11 between citizens and

662 (2005). However, some have argued that the Japanese American cases are limited to
their facts. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(stating the cases are like "a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.").
306.
REHNQUIST, supra note 304, at 203-09, 211 (arguing that judicial review is
inappropriate to determine "military necessity" and that there was real fear of a Japanese
attack on the West Coast).
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offered citizens, the courts generally have been unwilling to protect the political rights of
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also Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729, 744, 752 (D.D.C. 1988) (permitting citizens to
return from conference in Syria, but placing resident aliens at the same conference in
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non-citizens, it seems to have become pivotal.31 2 By the time Yaser Hamdi
renounced his citizenship in Saudi Arabia,3 13 he had spent three years in
custody without charges. Without the protections of his citizenship, he
might have spent many more.
Since Hamdi is unlikely to ever challenge his renunciation, the issue of
his individual citizenship will likely remain an academic one. Nevertheless,
broader concern of citizenship rights will likely acquire far greater import.
Proposed revisions to the Patriot Act grant the government the power to
strip a citizen of U.S. citizenship if it determines that the citizen has "joined
or provided material support to terrorist organizations., 3 14 Such legislation
would find involvement with 'a3 15
terrorist group prima facie evidence of
"intent to relinquish citizenship.
If such legislation does ever become the law of the land, the status of a
terrorist's citizenship could become anything but academic.316 Indeed, the
stakes could scarcely be higher. As Aharon Barak, Chief Justice of Israel
wrote: "Terrorism does not justify the neglect of accepted legal norms ....
312.
See George P. Fletcher, Guantanamo Disentangled? The U.S. Supreme Court
Step in Citizenship and Personhoodin the Jurisprudenceof War, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 953,
957-958 (2005).
Justice Scalia's argument, in which Justice Stevens joined, merits serious
attention because it addresses the central question of whether citizens deserve greater
protection than the foreigners confined in GuantAnamo Bay. Scalia needed this argument in
order to justify his switching sides between the Hamdi and Rasul cases. He voted in favor of
relief for Hamdi, together with Justice Stevens, but the two divided in the Rasul case on the
rights of foreigners confined in GuantAnamo Bay...
There is only one problem with this way of distinguishing between citizens and
aliens. There is no apparent basis either in the text or the historical tradition for limiting the
writ of habeas corpus to citizens. In the course of Scalia's 8600-word opinion in Hamdi, he
cites no explicit authority and he makes no convincing arguments about why the Constitution should be read in the narrow way that he takes to be self-evident.
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[A] democratic state acts within the framework of the law . . . It is,
therefore, not merely a war of the State against its enemies; it is a war of the
Law against its enemies. 31 7
Seen in that light, Hamdi's citizenship stands for something far more
significant: it is the linchpin of the rule of law, and represents it for millions
of American citizens. After all, the contention that " 'the innocent have
nothing to fear' is cold comfort and poor constitutional argument. The very
principle that imprisons the guilty can be used to seize the innocent., 3 18 Our
nationhood demands "communality of dignity as well as communality of
fate., 3 19 As John Donne put it 400 years ago:
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away
by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory
were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own
were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for
whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. 320
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